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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In re KOBEKT W. HUGHES f Case 
Disciplinary Proceedings ( W 0 , ^ 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action wherein Robert W. Hughes, a 
member of the Utah State Bar, had disciplinary proceed-
ings commenced against him for a violation of the Code 
of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial 
Ethics. Based upon its findings of wrongdoing, the 
Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar recom-
mended that Robert W. Hughes be suspended from the 
practice of law for the period of one year and thereafter 
until Robert W. Hughes shall reimburse the Utah State 
Bar for the actual expenses incurred by it in connection 
with the disciplinary proceeding. Hughes has appealed 
to the Supreme Court for the reduction of that recom-
mended penalty. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Robert W. Hughes is an attorney at law and is a 
member of the Utah State Bar. He maintains an office 
at 80 West Louise Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, but 
spends much of his time outside of the state of Utah 
(Tr.6,7). 
Hughes and one Frank Bakker formed a corpora-
tion known as Little Dutch Girl Bakers, Inc., in about 
1971. They each owned 125 shares of stock in said cor-
poration which gave each of them a 50 percent owner-
ship of the corporation at its inception. Hughes became 
an officer, director, and was legal counsel for the cor-
poration (Tr. 9). After the formation of the company, 
a decision was made to have a public offering of stock 
to generate capital to expand the company, and efforts 
were made to raise some operating capital prior to fil-
ing a regulation A application with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Tr. 20). The amount decided 
upon as preregistration capital was $50,000 (Tr. 21). 
This was to be accomplished by selling 100,000 shares 
of stock at $.50 per share (Tr. 22). Due to underwriting 
requirements, Hughes and Bakker were limited to the 
number of shares they could own, but Hughes cannot 
recall what number of shares they were allowed to re-
tain by the underwriter, but of that he did retain or 
was allowed to- retain, he had given up almost all of the 
shares he owned (Tr. 23, 24), and had only between 
500 and 1,000 shares of stock left to his personal dis-
posal (Tr. 26). 
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Hughes started soliciting preregistration subscrip-
tions from several investors. As he would collect monies 
from them, he would place those monies in the corpo-
rate account (Tr. 31). One exception to that practice was 
money he collected from Lee Fong for the purchase of 
4,000 shares of stock for which he collected $2,000 and 
which he deposited to his own account (Tr. 29-30). He 
claimed Bakker had agreed that he could deposit the 
$2,000 investment from Fong in his own account to cover 
expenses he had incurred in selling stock (Tr. 35), but 
Bakker denied that he gave Hughes that authority or 
that he even knew Lee Fong had invested money in the 
company until several months later when the applica-
tion for a regulation A registration was returned by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission at which time 
he saw Lee Fong's name on it for the first time dis-
covered that Lee Fong had invested $2,000 in the Com-
pany (Tr. 255). 
Hughes also claimed the need for that $2,000 be-
cause Bakker had stopped payment on a $1,000 com-
pany check that had allegedly been given to him for one 
reason or another (Exhibit 2). That check was made 
out in all regards by Bakker except for the payee which 
Hughes admits he filled in himself (Tr. 36). Bakker 
testified that the reason he filled out the check com-
pletely with exception of the payee was because neither 
he nor Hughes could recall the name of the labor union 
fund from whom a loan had been made and who should 
receive the money. He did know the union represent-
ative's name as Avard Booth, and so indicated that 
3 
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on the ledger portion of the check register (Exhibit 17), 
but left it up to Hughes to put the name of the union 
as the payee when Hughes determined the correct name 
of the union to which the loan should be repaid (Tr. 
248-255). He had never given Hughes permission to put 
his own name in as payee on that check (Tr. 255). The 
justification for diverting Lee Fong's $2,000 is, there-
fore, suspect on its face. 
Hughes takes two positions in his testimony con-
cerning the Fong check for $2,000. First, he claims en-
titlement to the funds because the company owed him 
money (Tr. 35), but later claims that the $2,000 he re-
ceived from Fong never belonged to the company be-
cause he was selling Fong some of his own stock and 
not company treasury stock (Tr. 41). He claims he sold 
Fong 4,000 shares of his own stock, but really only had 
either 500 or 1,000 shares of his own stock available for 
sale (Tr. 26). 
Hughes further confuses the question of whose stock 
was sold to Fong for the $2,000 by admitting that he 
would have deposited that $2,000 in the company ac-
count in the Los Angeles area if he had been going back 
to the Los Angeles area after seeing Fong, but because 
he was going in another direction on a trip, he decided to 
place it in his own account (Tr. 56,137). Before diverting 
the $2,000 Fong check for services and expenses, he had 
not submitted itemized billings to his client for services 
and expenses (Tr. 55). 
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Concerning the inclusion of Lee Fong's name on the 
notification under regulation A that Hughes filed with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, (Exhibit 
D-13), it should be noted that it has a different type 
style than all of the other material on that notification, 
and also has a different margin setting. I t appears to 
have been included sometime after the remainder of the 
notification was prepared (Tr. 178-179). 
The other portion of the charge that the Bar Com-
mission found that Hughes had committed, in addition 
to the foregoing, concerned a matter where Hughes re-
ceived $1,000 from a client, Gordon Leonard, to settle 
some collection judgments that attorney Robert Ryberg 
had against Mr. Leonard for some clients that he was 
representing. Hughes cannot remember for sure whether 
Leonard gave him a thousand-dollar check or $1,000 in 
cash. After receiving those funds from Leonard he may 
have deposited them in a general account in which he 
transacted his everyday affairs, but did not deposit it 
in a trust account or some other separate account so 
as to avoid commingling funds. About two months after 
the Leonard funds were commingled with his own funds 
or were otherwise used by him, he wrote a check to Ry-
berg to settle Leonard's account with Ryberg's clients 
which was dishonored by the bank because it exceeded 
collected funds in the account at that time. Another 
$1,500 check out of another general account was given 
to Ryberg sometime ?j,ter in satisfaction of that trans-
action (Tr. 85-97). Hughes does not dispute the fact 
that he did not place his client's money in a separate 
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identifiable trust account and admits he either com-
mingled them with his general account or otherwise used 
them for his own purposes. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE BAR COM-
MISSION ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS ITS 
RECOMMENDATION THAT ROBERT W. 
HUGHES BE SUSPENDED FROM THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF 
ONE YEAR AND THEREAFTER UNTIL 
ROBERT W. H U G H E S SHALL REIM-
BURSE THE UTAH STATE BAR FOR THE 
ACTUAL EXPENSES INCURRED BY IT IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE DISCIPLINARY 
PROCEEDING. 
Through three days of hearings and 300 pages of 
testimony, there was more than ample and sufficient 
credible testimony that the hearing officers of the Bar 
Commission could rely upon to support their findings. 
Those findings, insofar as they are material to this ap-
peal, were that during the months of July and August, 
1972, Robert W. Hughes was a promoter and officer 
and director of and attorney for Bakker's Little Dutch 
Girl Bakeries, Inc. Among his duties as a promoter was 
the raising of capital from private investors prior to a 
proposed public offering. Among his duties as attorney 
was preparation of notification under regulation A for 
filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
On or about August 5, 1972, Robert W. Hughes received 
a check from investor Lee Fong in amount $2,000 for 
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4,000 shares of the capital stock of Little Dutch Girl 
Bakeries. Robert W. Hughes deposited said check in his 
personal bank account and used the proceeds to reim-
burse himself for expenses claimed to have been in-
curred on behalf of the corporation in promoting pri-
vate investors to purchase stock prior to said public 
offering even though his right to do so was disputed by 
his client, and commingled the proceeds of said check with 
his personal funds and did not notify Little Dutch Girl 
Bakeries of the receipt of said check or maintain a rec-
ord of said check or render accounts to Little Dutch 
Girl Bakeries of his expenses in the promotion of this 
sale of a said stock or of the receipt of said check. Those 
findings of fact, having to do with Lee Fong investment 
in Little Dutch Girl Bakeries are amply supported by 
the record, as shown in the preceding statement of facts. 
The hearing officers of the Bar Commission were 
also justified in their finding of fact that prior to July 
9, 1971, Robert W. Hughes received from a client, Gor-
don Leonard, sums to be delivered to counsel for a per-
son having a judgment against said Leonard. Robert 
W. Hughes deposited said amount in his personal ac-
count and commingled said amount with his personal 
funds and, on or about July 9, 1971, issued a check from 
said acount, payable to counsel for said party in amount 
$1,500, which check failed to clear as written against 
"uncollected funds". Said Robert W. Hughes did not on 
July 9, 1971, or on August 5, 1972, maintain a trust ac-
count nor did he deposit in one or more identifiable bank 
accounts maintained in the state in which his law of-
7 
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fice was situated, funds of his clients without deposit-
ing in the same account funds belonging to him. Hughes, 
by his own admission, commingled his client's funds on 
both the Lee Fong transaction and the Leonard trans-
action with his own funds. 
Based upon its findings of fact, the Bar Commis-
sion found that Hughes violated the Provisions of Eule 
I I I , Canon 9, DE 9-102 (A) and (B) (1) and (3) by apply-
ing funds of his client to his own use when his right 
to do so was disputed by his client and in failing to 
maintain the funds of his client in one or more identi-
fiable bank accounts maintained in the state in which 
his law office was situated and in depositing his funds 
in accounts in which client's funds were deposited, and 
in failing to notify his client of the receipt of that 
client's funds and in failing to maintain records of funds 
of a client coming into his possession and rendering 
appropriate accounts to his client regarding them. The 
verbatum provisions of Canon 9 that were violated as 
follows: 
DE 9-102: Preserving Identity of Funds and 
Property of a Client. 
(A) All funds of a client paid to a lawyer or law 
firm, other than advances for costs and ex-
penses, shall be deposited in one or more 
identifiable bank accounts maintained in 
the state in which the law office is situated 
and no funds belonging to the lawyer or 
law firm shall be deposited therein except 
as follows : 
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(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay 
bank charges may be deposited there-
in. 
(2) Funds belonging part to a client and 
in part presently or potentially to 
the lawyer or law firm must be de-
posited therein, but the portion be-
longing to the lawyer or law firm may 
be withdrawn when due unless the 
right of the lawyer or law firm to re-
ceive it is disputed by the client, in 
which event the disputed portion shall 
not be withdrawn until the dispute is 
finally resolved. 
(B) A lawyer shall: 
(1) Promptly notify a client of the re-
ceipt of his funds, securities, or other 
properties. 
(3) Maintain complete r e c o r d s of all 
funds, securities, and other properties 
of a client coming into the possession 
of the lawyer and render appropriate 
accounts to his client regarding them. 
As was set out in the statement of facts, and as is 
apparent in reading the transcript of the proceedings, 
there is some conflict in the evidence as to whether 
Hughes was selling his own stock to Fong when he sold 
Fong 4,000 shares for the payment of $2,000, or whether 
he was selling treasury stock from the corporation. The 
conflict in the testimony is, however, only in the differ-
ent versions of it that Hughes testified to. Insofar as 
the testimony from Mr. Bakker was concerned, Hughes 
did not have authority to divert the $2,000 to his own 
9 
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use, and as a matter of fact, the corporation was in dire 
straits at that time and critically needed the capital to 
remain in operation. 
Even though Hughes attempts to justify the diver-
sion of that $2,000 because the company owed him ex-
pense money, his entitlement to those funds must be 
handled in accordance with the Code of Professional 
Eesponsibility in Canons of Judicial Ethics, which all of 
the testimony clearly shows he violated in the manner 
in which he handled the $2,000 he received from Lee 
Pong. He admittedly had never rendered a billing to 
his client and, according to the testimony of Mr. Bakker 
and Mr. Monson, he never notified them of the Lee Fong 
investment, and they only found out about it after the 
regulation A application was returned by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission several months after 
Hughes had taken the $2,000 from Lee Fong and di-
verted it into his own account. 
Appellant would ask the court to believe that there 
was no attempt to conceal the fact that Fong was a 
stockholder, however, that contention must be weighed 
in the light of all of the evidence. That evidence is that 
neither Bakker nor Monson were advised that Fong 
was an investor, his name ivas included on the regula-
tion A application at sometime other than when the 
major portion of that application was prepared and 
signed by Mr. Bakker, and that it was placed on the 
regulation A application at the bottom of the page by 
10 
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the use of a different typewriter than had been used to 
type the remainder of the application, and had margins 
incorrectly set. Also, the money was not deposited in 
the company account and a check drawn for expenses 
by Hughes, even though Hughes had authority to write 
checks on the company account. 
Hughes concedes the fact that he commingled client's 
funds with his own and did not render an appropriate 
account to the company (Appellant's Brief, page 7), but 
he attempts to justify his actions by claiming he did 
more work in promoting the company than did Bakker 
and Monson, and that Bakker and Monson were reim-
bursed for some of their expenses. While Hughes may 
have had some entitlement to the corporate monies, the 
manner in which he exercised control over the company's 
property is what is suspect and is what constitutes the 
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and 
Canons of Judicial Ethics. 
Hughes also concedes that he commingled the Leon-
ard funds with his own, and in the transcript of the 
proceedings, the indication isj that possibly it was more 
than commingling of funds in that instance, and he ad-
mitted that he may have merely spent the funds given 
him by his client, and then tried to cover them at a 
later date out of his general account. Either way that 
transaction came about, it admittedly was an improper 
transaction and in violation of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics. 
11 
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The appellant does not specifically challenge the 
validity of the findings of fact made by the bar com-
missioners, but urges that the facts are a little different 
than they were found to be by the Commissioners. This 
court has, on several occasions, set out the standard by 
which it will consider the bar commission's findings of 
fact. In Ee Fullmer, 17 U.2d 121, 405 P.2d 343, the 
Court stated: 
"The review of that proceeding in this Court 
is not like an ordinary appeal or administrative 
review because the order to be made is a respon-
sibility of this court. Nevertheless, this Court is 
disposed to follow the same pattern generally 
and to look upon the findings and the recommen-
dation of the Bar Commission with indulgence; 
and not to disregard its action lightly, nor at all, 
unless there was something to pursuade this Court 
that the Commission has acted capriciously or 
arbitrarily or beyond the scope of its powers, or 
is plainly in error." 
In Ee Wade, 27 U.2d 410, 497 P.2d 22, the Court re-
affirmed that position and stated: 
"This Court is committed to the proposition 
that the findings of the Board of Commissioners 
be accepted as the facts of the case unless it ap-
pears that the Board has acted capriciously or 
arbitrarily or went beyond its powers". 
The appellant on page 9 of his brief, basically con-
cedes that the findings of fact and decision of the Bar 
Commission are reasonably supported by the evidence 
and are neither arbitrary nor capricious. The appellant 
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feels, however, that even with those findings of fact that 
no punishment at all should be given for the violations, 
or that a greatly reduced punishment would be more ap-
propriate. 
In the Fullmer case, previously cited, the attorney 
wrongfully converted his client's money to his own use, 
and the Bar Commission recommended a three-year sus-
pension from the practice of law as the appropriate 
punishment. The Supreme Court adopted the Bar Com-
mission's recommendation and required the attorney to 
take a three-year suspension from the practice of law. 
In the Wade case, the attorney was found guilty of 
neglecting to attend to his client's affairs and in failing 
to maintain complete records of a client's funds, securi-
ties, and properties which were entrusted to him and in 
failing to account to the client therefore. The Bar Com-
mission recommended a two-year suspension which sus-
pension was ordered by the Supreme Court. 
The actions of Mr. Hughes in this case are quite 
analogous to those in the Fullmer case and the Wade 
case, and considering the fact that Mr. Hughes is guil-
ty of two separate violations of the Code of Profession-
al Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics, the one-
year suspension would appear to be warranted, and suf-
ficiently mild to adequately reprimand Mr. Hughes for 
his unprofessional conduct. I t could be argued that the 
one-year suspension is not harsh enough punishment for 
the two violations, and would tend to show the bar com-
missioners hearing the case were very compassionate in 
only recommending a one-year suspension. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
It is respectfully submitted that the Bar Commis-
sion's recommendation be adopted and that Mr. Hughes 
be required to take a one-year's suspension from the 
practice of law, with the suspension to become effective 
upon the issuance of the remittitur. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WENDELL E. BENNETT 
Suite 100 John Hancock Building 
455 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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